/2 cont./

614 887 156 The chieftaincy of each clan was filled by the oldest man, who was called chunel. (It seems to have the same meaning as the word catinab, but some informants recognized the latter as the one used in the adjacent municipality of Oxchuc.) The office was not hereditary, and upon the death of a chunel the oldest man 156 614 888 of the clan was venerated as such. The chief of the clan was respected and feared, because he was recognized as endowed with supernatural power which, through his lab, he exercised over all 776 554 the members of the clan. Two informants of advanced age defined the chunel as "the oldest one and the greatest sorcerer." The lab feeds on souls, and a person who has "done wrong" is 776 761 [784] [626] "eaten" by the lab of the one offended and dies. In this way social control was exercised on and among the members of the clan, never going beyond the limits of this. The life of the individual is intimately bound to the life of the lab, or guardian 776 spirit; the death of one brings with it the death of the other. All the Cancuqueros have their lab, but they hide it and sometimes [756] [827] deny it. The curer knows which is the lab of the sick person because "he hears it in the pulse." The lab reveals itself in dreams [787] to "its owner," with whom it speaks because "it is his own company." One person discovers the lab of another "because he sees it." The lab takes care of its owner, defends him, and is the in- 178 614 626 776 strument of revenge for an injury unjustly received. Today this concept is intimately bound up with the omniscience of the patron saint; only with the permission of San Juan can a lab "eat" the soul of a chapomal, or "clan brother," and this permission is granted only in the case when the saint is unfavorably impressed by the conduct of the individual. In any case the lab never wreaks its vengeance except for a bad act that would fully justify 614 626 it according to the social morality. As can be seen, social control was not only rooted in the chief of the clan, but this function extended to the whole group, as happens at present.

/16 cont./
614 595 two women belonged to the same clan, and in the other two they were women from two different clans. The levirate and sororate
587 [774] exist, but do not constitute a custom practiced /17/ by many; formerly it must have been more frequent, as is proved by the fact of designating the stepfather and stepmother by the same terms used for the father's brother and mother's sister, respectively,
583 614 and the stepchildren as nephews and nieces. There are several cases of marriage between brother and sister of one clan and sister
582 and brother of another clan. Marriage between cross-cousins is frequent, especially that of a man with the daughter of the mother's brother. Husband and wife always belong to the same generation.

591 Residence is patrilocal, with temporary matrilocal residence for a year after marriage.

593 614 964 There still prevails the custom that those who intercede in a direct manner in the preparation of the cadaver and in the inhumation must be members of a different clan. If a married woman who has not had children dies, she is buried with her relatives, without the intervention of her husband.

614 The members of one and the same clan co-operate among themselves and lend each other mutual aid; the younger people obey and respect their elders in the same way that a younger brother respects and obeys his older brother. And we have stressed
[626] [754] how "sorcery" is practiced only within the limits of the clan as a means of social control.

Mexico City,
Mexico

101 114 122 Note: The materials for the present study were collected during two seasons of field work: May-June, 1945, and June, 1946, financed by the University of Chicago, Instituto Nacional de Antropología de México, and Government of the State of Chiapas.

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It is in the context of these structural divisions that social change and its behavioral indices must be analyzed.

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Homicide—an act viewed as a delict in national Mexican law—has in the past two decades become an accepted strategy in social interaction. It is part of the expectations of the society upon which members predicate their own code of behavior and in terms of which they react to others. Gossip not only fails to suppress homicide, but serves to create a consensual base for condoning it. The corpse is referred to as "the one who had the guilt," *ta stukel smul*, and even when knowledge of the particular act is lacking, certain assumptions are made: the killer was someone in the community; the victim provoked the killer. In listing crimes, informants sometimes failed to mention killing, or they included it after witchcraft, theft, or adultery. Homicide is considered a *reaction* to crime, not a crime in itself.

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[521]
[764]
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The rate is phenomenally high—up to 251.2 per 100,000 (when adjusted to bring the whole township's population of a little over 3,000 to the base for measuring international rates)—and it is increasing. This compares with national rates of 4.8 for the United States, 31.9 for Mexico (United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1964), and 36.2 for a nearby town (Favre 1964).

The following tabulation summarizes the homicides by decades since 1915, the earliest date for which records are available.

1915–1924	4
1925–1934	5
1935–1944	19
1945–1954	9
1955–1964	35

[114]

Figures prior to 1950 are not apt to be accurate, for only since that time have there been adequate reporting and checking of township records. In the following tabulation, the marked increase in the annual number of homicides since 1960 represents a real increase.

1950	1	1958	1
1951	0	1959	1
1952	1	1960	4
1953	1	1961	7
1954	1	1962	6
1955	0	1963	7
1956	1	1964	4
1957	4	1965	9

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In order to assess the meaning of its remarkable increase during the 1960's, I have pro-

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682 694 75 these suspicions and kill the witch. If he should kill the witch while the patient is still alive, it is believed that the patient will die.

682 685 674 [463] [697] Killing men for cattle theft (six cases) is a relatively recent occurrence. It has put homicide on the market: the associations of cattle-owners have hired killers in three of the six cases. In addition to the killer's fee, they pay the fine to release him from prison. Fines for homicide have increased in the past five years—from 1,000 to 3,000 pesos—but not sufficiently to price the murder of cattle thieves out of the market. A good bull is worth [435] 1,500 pesos, and the threat of further loss by theft seems to justify the expenditure of fees and fines. When the cattle-owners lose some of their herd, they go to spiritualists or to San Miguel, the talking saint of Ixtapa, to find out who did the stealing. Since such evidence does not hold up in court, legal settlement is not attempted. Legal action, moreover, would create an enemy who might seek revenge. A Ladino secretary of the town center who had lost a bull accused a man of stealing his cattle and demanded 500 pesos in compensation. By receiving the money he jeopardized his safety, and eventually he had to leave town.

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The Resolution of the Case

682 69 It is nearly impossible to find witnesses to homicide. Of these 37 cases, 28 resulted in no action being taken by the authorities, and in five cases where the killers went to jail, they were released with the payment of minimal fines. In the calculations of the townspeople, it is hardly worth risking one's neck to get such a minimal revenge.

682 593 626 [683] However, this does not mean that homicide goes unnoticed in the community. After killing the widow sings of the life of the dead man. If she is in agreement with the verdict arrived at by the killer and others, she will deny knowledge of what he has done, or even suggest that she too was aware of what harm he has caused (one widow implied that her husband, killed as a witch, was responsible for the death of four of her six children). If she objects to the verdict, she sings of what a good man he was and how blameless. She will then air her own suspicions in the following weeks as to who killed her husband.

682 683 627 Following the funeral, when the women have left the cemetary, the men sit at the grave. As they measure out a liter of liquor and pass it around, they advance hypotheses as

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682 539 783 Thus I fare well. I have not been killed, nor have I been sick.

682 156 828 A good man is of one heart, and he shows it by his humility, *ben k'un yo?tan* or "very soft heart." He can drink with friends on either side of the dual division of the town, and he is called upon in many household fiestas to greet the guests of the house owner.

But the man who is "very strong of heart," *ben toyol yo?tan*, who "fails to take people into account," *ma ?awa ta kuenta*, who "abuses people," *me ya wut*, has means of survival despite the many threats to his life. He surrounds himself with a circle of *compadres*, or godparents; he especially picks out curers, both to mitigate the use of their power against him, and for them to serve as intermediaries if he should have enemies with animal spirits. When a threat becomes imminent, he may stay within his house or limit his range of activities to a very circumscribed area, always taking a weapon when he does go out. He will usually try to limit his drinking, or give it up entirely. These short-range rules of avoidance are clearly indicated by the circumstances in which killings occur: in the hills or at night, when the victim is under the influence of liquor.

[608] [756] [273]

682 These 37 cases of homicide reveal a regularity in the kinds of people and situations involved. The victims are most often men who assert power, principally curers, or men who violate standards of behavior by abusiveness or theft. Their killers are often linked to them by kinship or neighborhood, the bonds in which tensions are greatest. The regularity of time and place of homicide suggests the precautions that can be taken to avoid being killed if one has an enemy. The general failure of the community social-control agents to bring negative sanctions against a killer indicates that homicide is an accepted solution for interpersonal conflict. The structural setting that validates this behavior is discussed below.

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II. STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

682 178 121 626 Case analysis, useful for discerning certain patterns, is inadequate for understanding the interrelationships among a variety of social changes in the community. An increasing rate of homicide of this magnitude indicates fundamental changes in the social matrix in which individual decisions are made: it suggests not

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682 only a rise in the tensions that provoke con-
178 flict, but an undermining of the social-control
121 mechanisms for channeling them. The percep-
626 tion of these changes by the members of the society makes for shifts in the individual calculi, grossly measured in changes in the rate of behavior. In order to understand the interrelated problems of the sources of the increasing tensions and the reasons homicide is chosen as a means of resolving them, I have reconstructed the course of social change in the period from 1935 to 1965.

[128]

178 *Increasing Social Tensions*

556 New economic enterprises have increased wealth differences in the community. The best measure of this is in the increase in cattle-holding, which is a socially approved way of spending money. Twenty-five years ago, there were only a half-dozen men with cattle, and they had only one or two head each. Today,
178 one of the herders in the community has 200
233 head of cattle, and 75 percent of the households
556 have one or more each.

Cattle-herding is a "new" industry in the sense that instead of just having a team of oxen to help with agricultural labor, men are
233 breeding cattle for profit. Because the cattle
685 roam freely, there is much loss, and this leads to accusations of theft. I have never heard such accusations directed against anyone outside the community; crime as well as positive moral relationships is confined within the
682 boundaries of this corporate community. Sus-
685 pected cattle thieves are killed by the cattle-
[474] owner or by a killer hired by the cooperative of cattle-owners. Such killings account for six of the 37 cases analyzed above (Table 1).

178 The illicit distilling of liquor has also added
274 to the town's prosperity. The liquor industry was introduced about 15 years ago, but the number of distillers has increased from 5 to 40
[438] in the last five years. From an enterprise
[439] formerly meeting only local market needs, contraband liquor is now sold as far away as the coastal area and across the border in
274 Guatemala. A cooperative of distillers has re-
474 duced the frictions that immediately followed the introduction of liquor-distilling. The cooperative pays the fines of any member caught distilling, and in addition threatens to use group action against informers, who were formerly tempted to earn the 200 pesos offered
[578] by federal agents. But the envy aroused by the sight of those who profit from this enterprise,

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as with the cattle industry, is a covert cause for personal attacks on other grounds.

A third enterprise, trucking, has caused a realignment of political interests in factions associated with two truck-owning cooperatives. Membership in one of the cooperatives, or patronage of one of the two trucks, arouses the enmity of members of the other cooperative. Several threats have been made on the lives of the owners and the operators, but the only damage done has been to tires.

The tensions resulting from the introduction of these new enterprises cannot be fully measured by the deaths attributed to direct economic conflict. Wealth differences resulting from the new enterprises excite envy, and with it come accusations of witchcraft. In this community, witchcraft killing does not perform the normative function of reducing wealth differentiation that Kluckhohn saw operating among the Navaho (1944), since it is the poor man who is killed as a witch, not the rich man. The slaying of the envious witch exacerbates the economic differentiation that provides the seedbed for conflict.

Another new source of tension is found in the growing demand for political leadership or even independence from the township by the *ejido* colonies formed since land reform went into effect in 1937. The inept maneuvers of two founders of the ejido colonies in hot country resulted in two homicides (cases 12 and 18 in Table 1).[4] The increasing strength of these hamlets will mean that more attempts will be made in the future to gain political equality and/or independence. Whether this will result in increasing homicides will depend on social-control agencies external to the Indian communities.

Homicide occurring as a direct result of economic and political competition represents a new strategy in the community. The decision to kill rather than to use other negative sanctions is related to the social-control mechanisms discussed below.

Changing Mechanisms of Social Control

A system of social control rests not only on the exercise of negative sanctions, but on the sense of personal security derived from confidence in the institutions of control. In Teklum, the maintenance of control was formerly centered in the guardianship against malevolent spirits held by the ancestor spirits and the curers. The "police force," made up of ten

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625 The "police force", made up of ten
• 686 Indians of the town who served without pay for a year, acted as errand boys more than as guardians of public safety. The townspeople conformed to the cultural code of behavior because of a sense that their welfare was being cared for.

626 More recently, the breakdown of certain
178 structural features and competition between
756 new and old leaders have undermined non-
violent methods for the maintenance of social
[128] control. These changes will be discussed in terms of (1) the organization of the curing profession, (2) conflict between the curers and the civil authority, and (3) how both the curing profession and the civil authority are affected by the breakdown of the old dual division of the town.

[124] (*1*) *Organization of the curing profession.* Perception of structural changes in the curing profession and their effect on attitudes are indicated in the following statement by an informant:

> Formerly there were not many curers. Only two—one in the low side and the other in the high side. They alone spoke together. They walked every night, looking and watching over the pueblo to see that no illness was brought in, checking to see who was bringing it and to see if there was any illness of God [reference to contagious diseases]. They saw which of the children had a soul
> [174] [reference to the third soul, the swayohel or animal spirit, which gives the power to cure and to do evil].
>
> If anyone wanted to be cured, they bathed them, cured them, and in a little while people got better because there was good illness only. If later on it turned into a disease of the devil, with their animal spirit they seized the force of the illness.
>
> When there was a contagious disease, and a witch "brought heat," and the children began to die, the two curers alone consulted and waited to see who had brought the evil and where they lived. One of them went to the town hall and gave an account of the fact that they had taken care of the evil and gotten rid of it. It was not necessary to gather together the pueblo—only the two knew what was the matter and how to care for it.
>
> The [two] leader curers of each section [*stalal ?u?uletik*] alone ordered other curers. No one else could enter curing until permitted by the leaders. They continued in power until they died, and then one of the younger curers took over.
>
> Beginning in 1940, more curers started to enter on their own accord. The elder curer had died, and his successor was not recognized. People saw that someone could pulse, and so they would ask him to cure.
>
> Now when there is an epidemic, the president

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• 626 178 756 orders the curers to gather together. The curers look for the man who has "brought the heat." And then they kill him. Formerly it was not so.

The statement points to two interacting features of change within the curing profession: (1) the loss of leadership and of control over entry into the profession and (2) the loss of faith in the guardianship function of the curers. The effect of these changes has been to reduce security and the maintenance of social control.

756 178 [621] Formerly the recognized leader of the curers in each section of the dual division legitimized entry of new curers and expelled those who abused their power. When these curers died, there was no one of sufficient power to replace them. In listing curers who are active today, there is no agreement as to who the leading curers are or even as to whether there are leaders.

756 Loss of leadership in the curing profession has led to competition among the curers. There is discussion such as the following concerning who is the strongest:

> When N (a former curer, killed as a witch) was alive, he was land-control officer. When we were half drunk one day, the president asked him: "Tell me who is the strongest of all you who know curing." N replied, "Ah, you want to hear. There is no one who is very strong, only the dead Mamal K and myself." The president said, "But Mam D is good." N said, "Less so. I know because one time we proved it, at a meeting of the curers. I arrived as a sheep, and 'took out' [literal translation of *Hok*'] one black dog. He took out a sheep and a pig and ordered them to run. And I saw that they could not run. After my animals ran a little with his, mine arrived first. It is thus that I saw his were less strong."

[541] The present competition among the curers to assert their power by telling such stories or by displaying fearlessness in the bullfights held in community fiestas is symptomatic of the disruption caused by the breakdown in the hierarchy of the profession. When curing was a controlled profession, abusive conduct by the curers was minimized, but the new curers are reputed to use their power for their own gain. The following story is typical:

756 539 J, born in Tetikil, went to live in hot country. A friend invited him to drink. J, who was reputed to be a curer, said to his friend when they were half drunk, "Do you want to 'take out' a girl?" His friend said, "No, how can you?" "*Pendejo!*" J replied, "I can because I have an animal

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accused him of being a witch, he was put in the local jail by the judge and then removed to the departmental capital. During his term of imprisonment an epidemic broke out in the town; it was attributed to witchcraft supposedly practiced by him and by two other curers who remained in town. These two were then imprisoned. After they were set free, all three men were killed in different episodes involving accusations of witchcraft. Permission to act as executioners was granted by the civil authority.

In the past, the public review of a case before a killing probably served to minimize homicide, since permission was not always granted. Since 1953, when a large highway first linked the town to the departmental capital and communication between this center of justice and the local township increased, the civil authority has not given permission, and prior review of witchcraft cases occurs only with epidemics.

The final incident in which the civil authority confronted the curers occurred in the spring of 1966. The president accused one of the curers of cutting short his life by lighting candles in the mountains. The curers were called together to hear the threat and to go to the hill to look at the evidence. The accused curer remained at home pleading that he was sick. He was warned not to pursue his witchcraft, and as yet there has been no use of violence on either side. This open confrontation without the use of violence may indicate a change in the strategy of conflict with the growing power of the president.

(3) *Breakdown of the dual division.* The loss of internal controls in the curing profession and the conflict for power and control by the civil officials and the curers are related to a more fundamental change in the social structure of the community. Formerly the division of the town into two sections provided a channel for opposition as well as cooperation. Recruitment into leadership positions in both the civil hierarchy and the curing hierarchy was based upon residence. The system provided checks and balances in the exercise of power, for the two principales—one from each section of the dual division—were supposed to act as watchdogs over the curers. The shift in the locus of social control from the principales to the president has been marked by the open confrontation with the curers.

The authority of the president, however,

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The authority of the president, however, depends on the use of legal sanctions of prison sentences and fines imposed by extracommunity enforcement agencies in the departmental capital. The weakness of these sanctions—the fine for homicide is 1,000 to 3,000 pesos or three to five years' imprisonment—means that these threats do not have a controlling effect on people's decisions to act. Homicide, carried out by individuals who feel themselves to be threatened, is a supplementary mechanism for social control. Cast in the idiom of witch-killing, homicide is the quasi-official execution of a community threat.

The breakdown in the former structural controls has not been compensated for by the intervention of extracommunity institutions. Attempts to circumvent killing are made by the priest, who counsels against it, warning that the killer will acquire the sins of the man he kills, and by the talking saint of Ixtapa, whom the Indians consult when they are pressed and who advises them to wait—their enemy will be killed for them. This advice is not sufficient to forestall all killings. Motivated by fear, some men still seek to eliminate the object of their fear.[7] The sense of the guardianship of the ancestors and their intermediaries, the curers, is lost along with the intervention of the civil authorities. The individual reacts, using his own means and trying to get sufficient consensus to avoid reprisal.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Homicide in the community of Teklum can be a statement of the fear of witchcraft, of revenge, or of quasi-official reprisal depending on the circumstances and social relationships involved. Even in this small, self-contained community, homicide does not have a single meaning, analyzable within a single framework of change.

Homicide is part of the expectation pattern of the town. The patterning of the acts of homicide in terms of time, place, and agent makes possible rules of avoidance both in long- and in short-term calculations for survival. The long-range rules require respect behavior to elders, equals, and juniors and the avoidance of abusive or boastful statements. The short-range rules are to avoid walking alone in the woods or milpas far from town, to stay home at night, and to stop drinking.

Despite the grim and expectable outcome of being killed, not all men heed these rules. The love of power and the projection of self into

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682 183 wider ranges of expression than are usually permitted in the community prompt men to assert the strength of their swayohel, to run races with the animal spirits of others in the assertion of pre-eminence, to boast of their material goods, and to "wake up dead."

682 694 178 578 The increasing rate of homicide is related to the following changes in the community:

(1) Increasing friction resulting both from the introduction of new economic enterprises and from political competition by the recently settled land-reform colonies has introduced a new kind of homicide, in which an opponent is killed either by the person whose interests are threatened or by hired killers. It has also stimulated accusations of witchcraft stemming from envy.

[754] 558 682 694 178 578 756 (2) The curers' loss of leadership and of control over entry into the curing profession has led to competition among them and to a loss of respect for their ability to overcome witchcraft. Curers have become the most frequent suspects of being witches.

754 (3) Loss of faith in the guardian ancestors and in the guardianship functions acquired from them by the curers has further undermined the position of the curers as agents of social control. This has aggravated the sense of insecurity and fear, which provokes the uncontrolled use of individual violence.

682 694 178 769 776 626 (4) The shift of power from the principales to the town president has led to a breakdown in the system of checks and balances exerted by the principales over the curers, and to a direct confrontation of the curers by civil officials.

682 694 178 621 626 756 (5) In the confrontations of the civil authorities and the curers in the '40's and early '50's, the fact that a witchcraft case was officially reviewed and the killing of the witch sanctioned may have served as a brake on the number of such homicides. Since 1953, when this practice was abandoned, those who have felt themselves or their families to be the victims of witchcraft have been left to their own recourse.

178 578 682 [621] [632] 756 The organizational changes summarized here are provoked by structural changes affecting recruitment into the positions of power and the validation of leadership in the exercise of power. The dual division of the town provided an accepted basis for recruiting

613 than three or four generations. In the past, these lineages were localized, and in places like Bachajon, Cancuc, and Oxchuc the exact locations are still remembered.

613 769 778 A few generations ago, the most distinguished members of each lineage were buried in the cave after which the paraje was named, the bones and ashes of the dead being placed in large jugs or urns. The caves were places for ceremonies honoring the ancestors. Blom (1954) made a study of these burials and mapped the distribution of the sites. These caves are still places for worship but not for burials; the cross protecting all members of the lineage is kept there, as well as, in some instances, small crosses belonging to the important members of it (Villa Rojas, 1946, p. 16).

614 The words *chapomal* and *tijinabal* name the members of the clan in general. It is said that "the neighbors of this paraje are all chapomales," or "those cannot get married because they are chapomales." Tijinabal also means neighbor or member of the same paraje. Another word, *patshunk*, is also an equivalent of tijinabal. These words are currently used in Oxchuc, Cancuc, and Bachajon. On the other hand, there is no specific word to designate the lineage.

[835] [574] The main function of the clan is to regulate marriage, as the union of two chapomales is considered incestuous. The clan also gives much self-confidence to the Indian who travels to other parajes, for he can always find hospitality among people of his own clan. It also has a function of social control, exercised by the old men of the group, who punish all transgressors against the established rules. Helped by the nagual (supernatural spirit), they find out about the behavior of the members of the clan and punish according to the crime (Villa Rojas, 1947).

614 626 887

613 428 The lineage relationship is also important in inheritance (especially land), since the plots should always be under the control of individuals of the same Indian name. Only where such persons are absent or missing or

273* 578 539 ... HATE YAHWAL NA HATE SWINKLEL Z'INE, *ABOT TON TA S(H)OL ... HIZ

That head of the house, that owner, was hit on the head with a rock.

MA K'OLO MA TONI.

A rock this big around.

HNA*TIK Z'IN, TU*L LIHK TE SK'OPIK Z'INE, LAH SMIL SBAIK.

We don't know how their argument began, he was killed.

... HA* MILAWAN SNEALI.

His son-in-law killed him.

... HATE MAC'A MILAWAN Z'INE, YIP LA HTATIK TAL Z'IN *A TE SMORAL, SMORALI, YIP LA HTABETAL Z'IN *A SOK CEB PIXLAL.

That one killed him, we only found his morral, only his morral and two hats.

... *ORA *ILI MA* TEK'AY *A, *ANIX LO*EL.

He's not here now, he fled.

M. HIC KOLOL Z'IN.

Then he got away.

273* The possibility that an individual when drinking is in fact speaking the truth is an entertainable idea especially under the circumstances that he reports information which individuals have been searching for unsuccessfully.

273* 626 578 In one text we find Mariano defending himself against statements he allegedly mace while he was drunk. The context in which these statements were made is as follows. The woman who

273* leads the prayers in the church (the rezadora) had two anonymous
626
578 notes left at her door, asserting that her character was incompatible with such a role. The effect of this accusation was sufficiently strong to cause her to withdraw from her position. She and her family tried to discover who the note writers were. Under these circumstances it was not long before a few candidates for this position were being considered.

273*
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626 Rules of evidence for finding the performers of anonymous acts are quite relaxed, though sufficient to the task from the
578 community's point of view. The successful anonymous act is not seen by anyone, hence the reconstruction of the act is made on the basis of motives, and on the succeeding acts which the allegedly guilty person may display. Furthermore, there may be special characteristics of the act which restrict the number of those who may be guilty. If, for example, a man is known to have been killed with a pistol, the assassin is conceded to be limited to one of those who is known to have a pistol. In the present case, a note was written in Spanish, and the author was hence limited to that handful of individuals in the community who can write Spanish. Mariano is perhaps one of the best Spanish writers in the community.

He further damned himself by saying while drunk that he wrote and delivered the note. In this text, he is talking with the rezadora who was forced out of her job, with the full knowledge

273* 695 626 578 that she has heard that he made these remarks while drunk and knows that he writes Spanish well. He constructs a conversation for her between himself and one Augustin (who also writes Spanish) in which Augustin asks him if he did in fact write the threatening note, as he had claimed in Augustin's presence to have done. (Mariano never admits himself that he made these remarks while drinking.)

273* 578 539 626 HTAH BA SOK Z'IN HAL *AWSTIN I.

Later I met Augustin.

*I.I ME HIC ME YUN HAT Z'IN LA *APAS HUN I, XYUTON.

"Is it true that you wrote the note?" he asked me.

TU*UN XKUT.

"Why?" I asked him.

HA*BI *AY LA *AWAL TA *AYAKBEL XCI, LA AWAL TA *AYAKBEL *ILI, HO*N LA HPAS HUN I, HO*N LA KAK' HIL TO *AK'E HIL TA STI* SNA XCIAT.

"Once when you were drunk you said so," he said, "You said, 'I wrote the note, I sent it to her house,' that's what you said," he said.

TU*N BA* LA HTA HBAHTIK XKUT.

"Where did we meet?" I asked him.

*AY LA HTA HBAHTIK TA YAKBEL, HO*N LA HPAS XCAT.

"Once we were drinking together, 'I did it,' you said."

*AYIL C'A*BAN MA HNA* MAC'A LA SPAS *EHK ABI, MA HA*KAT LA *APAS XKUTAT STUK HO*N E.

"'Stop it, be quiet, I don't know who did that. You didn't do it,' I said."

273* 539 578 • 626 HU*U HO*N LA HPAS XAWUTON HIL XCI.

"'Yes, I did,' you told me," he said.

TENEX *A HUL KAL XAN TA HNA Z'IN.

From there I went home to hear it again.

HA*C LA YAK'IK HKUC ... HA*C LA ... HO*N LA KAL TA HYAKBEL.

"They are blaming you ... ." that I said it when I was drunk.

PASE *AK BA* HTA YAKBEL METO, XKUT AWIX I.

"Don't worry, what I could have done when I was drunk?" I told your aunt.

273* 626 578 In telling his wife not to worry, Mariano implies that the rumor will lose its force since it cannot be true.

Mariano also makes it plain to the rezadora later in the text that he wonders at Augustin's insistence on calling this story to his attention and spreading it around town. He implies that Augustin is being somewhat aggressive in doing this or is trying to cover up his own part in the note-writing act. The rezadora draws the conclusion for Mariano that it is probably Augustin who wrote the note, with which conclusion Mariano agrees. Thereby, in this interaction at least, he not only denies any part in the act but also supplies the rezadora with another person who is probably guilty.

273* 578 Individuals in search of the source of hostile acts are not averse to searching the conversations of men who are drinking deeply. In turn, men who drink deeply may use the privileged

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nic unity extending back to the beginning of time. The people set boundaries by such external symbols as a locally specified costume for men and women, a distinctive dialect of Tzeltal, and specialization in the production of pottery. Implicit boundaries are established by socialization processes that inhibit response to the outside world and that define a code of behavior understandable only in its own context. The completely socialized member of the community is not expected to seek recognition, nor could he find prestige, outside these boundaries. The community comprises the moral universe: cooperation and reciprocity are limited to members of the community, as are most cases of homicide and theft. Lacking concrete evidence, people assume misdeeds to have been committed by someone from the community.

The boundaries that separate these Indians from other Indian communities as well as from non-Indian, or *Ladino*,[1] communities are social artifacts that give a sense of security to members of the in-group. They call themselves "the true men" (*b'atz'il winik*), and their world is defined in "the true word" (*b'atz'il k'op*). The latter is their term for the Tzeltal dialect of Maya which is the language of the house and of the street, the courthouse, and the church in the absence of the Spanish-speaking priest. Tzeltal names differ from Spanish names for most of the surrounding towns, the earth, the heavens, and the cosmological bodies. Catholic saints are incorporated under a Tzeltal name or a Tzeltal version of their Spanish name. All of the members of the community have a Tzeltal patronym in addition to the Spanish surname with which they are baptized. The given name is that of a Spanish saint but is shortened and pronounced with Tzeltal phonemes, and female names have the feminine prefix *s*. Their world is labeled in their own language.

The people assume that their expectations will be met and their projec-

1. The term Ladino has a range of usage throughout Middle America. In Mexico City, people define Ladino as any person who abuses his superior skills to take advantage of others. In Oaxaca, a Zapotec Indian defined Ladino as "an Indian who knows Spanish, has adopted western-style clothing, and takes advantage of other Indians because of his knowledge of the language and ways of life of the non-Indian society. He is like a fox." In Chiapas, the term is applied to any non-Indian without derogatory connotation, and the same is true in Guatemala. In the metalanguage of anthropological monographs, it is used in this latter sense.

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465 working long hours. Thus they receive 12 pesos for about one and a half times as many hours as is worked locally for the prevailing wage of 6 pesos (ten hours in comparison with the usual day's work of six to seven hours in the town). For this reason they maximize the effort expended in getting to fields outside of their own township. The lower payment in [476] town entails an obligation on the owner's part to reciprocate the labor, but the payment relieves him of an immediate demand on his time. Exchange 476 labor without payment requires reciprocity within the same activity schedule: thus if a man assists someone else during harvesting, he expects that person to assist him during the same harvest period. If, however, he will be unable to reciprocate immediately, the payment of 6 pesos terminates [465] an immediate obligation, but he will be expected to respond when he can if other requests should be made by this same farmer. Exchange labor without payment is contracted between relatives, compadres, and neighbors, using the network of established social ties to reinforce the obligation to reciprocate.

464 Agricultural work in the fincas in hot country is undertaken only when [434] there is extreme need for supplementary income, or when a man is escap- [754] ing the threat of being killed as a witch. In the 1920s, when the Indians had limited land resources and prevailing wages were low, some were forced to go to the fincas of the Argentino and Aregovia near Tapachula. [626] Despite the economic necessity for their undertaking this work, the social pressure was so strong against it that they would leave early in the morning to avoid being jeered as they passed in the street. The women rarely [462] accompanied them because they could produce pottery at home and supplement earnings. The prevailing rate now is 15 to 18 pesos per tarea, a [465] half-day's work, but Indians work in the finca only when urgently pressed.

Nonagricultural labor in the sawmills is a source of employment for twenty-two Indians of the town. Lumber companies operating in the forested areas of Montebello Lake have employed Indians of the town for [465] the past year. The wage offered, from 15 to 18 pesos a day, exceeds the 12-peso wage paid to agricultural laborers in the immediate area, but corresponds to that paid in hot country. The men must live at the sawmill, and supplies of tortillas made by their families are brought in on Wednesdays

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town. However, other cooperatives have been successfully organized to finance small-scale oeprations. Five record players with loudspeakers have been installed in the houses of members who sell liquor. Once the initial investment is made, the operating costs are low: 27 pesos for electricity, 25 pesos for a liquor license, 30 pesos for *haciends* or state tax, and 10 pesos for the township tax. Liquor bought at 60 pesos for an 18-liter jug is resold at 72 pesos. The total monthly cost of 92 pesos yields a net profit of about 300 pesos. The cost of the installation, 5,000 pesos, was low enough for some of the richer members of the community to finance individually, but as one of the operators told me, it was too risky—that is, too profitable. The envy the neighbors would feel on seeing the profits made would never result in witchcraft against all of the members, whereas an individual owner could expect that he himself or a member of his household would become ill or die as the victim of witchcraft. These early entrepreneurs recognize the value of the cooperative in overcoming the force of envy which has effectively inhibited acquisition or display in these corporate Indian communities. Instead of socializing losses, one of its functions in modern capital organizations, the cooperative in Tzo'ontahal serves to socialize gains.

The most enterprising action of the new cooperatives has been the purchase of a truck, initiated by the entrepreneur, Santos. The purchase of the truck was inspired by the example of the Ladino secretary, who with his wife and son had a monopoly on the transportation of pottery, people, and wheat out of the village. Furthermore, in the neighboring town of Zinacantan the Indians were successfully operating two trucks. Santos went with his brother to the director of the I.N.I. in Las Casas to ask for a cosigner on the installment purchase of a Chevrolet truck, since without a Ladino sponsor Indians could not get credit with the company. According to one informant, I.N.I. officials advised them that they would not be able to profit from this venture and that they should buy a tractor with their money. The brothers persisted and went to the Dodge company in the state capital. The company agreed to sell to the Indians without Ladino co-signers on the basis of a down payment of 10,000 pesos. The initial payment was raised with thirty Indians putting up the money. Some gave no more than 150 pesos, but as the instigators of the purchase remarked, "The more members we have, the more power it gives us."

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When this fails, they turn to the professional help of lawyers rather than to the old caciques with whom they had formerly maintained patron-client relations. The traditional structural alignment of upper and lower barrios is retained as the basis for organizing the growing cattle herds, but the cooperative provides flexibility and power for developing new enterprises.

The minimal changes in the material environment and the technology of the peasantry are countered by the development of social resources which should facilitate Indian integration in the wider society. In operating the new enterprises independently of Ladino control, they are developing entrepreneurial skills and an awareness of the relationship between capital and profit. The restriction of their operations to nonproductive use of capital for profit, such as buying crops at harvest and reselling as the price rises, reveals the limited dynamics of intracommunal development. The town will look to the regional and national networks for fundamental changes in its economy.

The fear of exciting envy acts as a brake on productive activity and the enjoyment of improved consumption resulting from wealth. Santos' death is a symbolic warning to others who would follow in his footsteps. An earlier case occurred when the ejido land grants were made in the 30s:

The brothers Ca?iletik became "very rich" as a result of careful operation of their ejido and privately owned land. They owned ten pair of oxen and about fifty horses. When they brought in their crops on horseback, it looked like a line of ants. They built a good house in Alkob', and a good threshing shelter. The people of the town began to talk about getting them off the land. The ejido commissioner took their land away and turned it over to others in the town. Until this day, the brothers Ca?iletik are without land. Now they do no more than work like other men. They live poorly. All their cattle and horses are sold.

The organization of the cooperatives is one means of diverting envy directed against individuals and permitting some increase in productive efforts, but the society still lacks the means of validating higher consumption standards. The richest man in town eats better than his neighbors,

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622 but his style of living is indistinguishable from theirs. The only difference
[23] is the larger number of dogs he keeps to guard his wealth stored in the
form of surplus crops in the eaves of his house.

177
178 The kind of economic change occurring in Tzo'ontahal fits the model
433 of a moving equilibrium. Tightly controlled behavioral schema preserve
434 the traditional productive activities in pottery and agriculture. They pro-
621 vide the framework into which the new enterprises are fit. Increasing de-
323 pendence of cosumption choices on external markets is slowly transform-
ing the content but not the pattern of community life. This kind of
change is limited to societies that form a distinct corporate group. In an
open society where many alternatives are available, the painful process of
accommodation of the new to a customary pattern would probably not be
undertaken given the tendency for social change to follow the course of
least resistence. The absorption of economic innovation in Tzo'ontahal il-
lustrates the ability of closed corporate communities to participate in com-
mercial undertakings and reformulate them to fit their own pattern.

1 [i.e., the richest man in town. - Analyst]

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Chapter 4

Family Authority and Community Control

All residents of the center consider themselves to be "true men" descended from the ancestors who lived in the cave. In Murdock's terminology (1965:63), the Indian community constitutes a *deme*, or local group of genealogically related residents who cannot trace the exact kinship tie. This sense of kinship sustains a model of paternal authority for assigning positions of power and prestige in the wider community. The key to persistence of the Indians as a culturally distinct population lies in these age-ordered hierarchies sanctioned by the ancestors and the elders who act as their intermediaries. The reward for remaining within the social control system is security and the right to their guardianship; the sanction against violating the norms is exile or exposure to the evil spirits they hold at bay.

The bilateral extension of age-relative collateral terms to all members of the same side of the dual division is a successful adaptation of the kinship model to the government of a compact nucleated community. The system of terminology is similar to that of the neighboring nucleated settlement of Aguacatenango which shares many of the same features of behavior (Hunt n.d., Metzger in Romney 1967:231). These systems are closer to those of the Coatlan Mixe (Merrifield and Hoogshagen 1961) and the Chinantec of Palantla (Merrifield 1959) than they are to the nearby Tzeltal-speaking communities of Cancuc (Guiteras Holmes 1947) and Oxchuk (Villa Rojas 1947). In the case of the Mixe and Chinantec, the strong emphasis on relative age is correlated with age-graded positions in the political-religious hierarchy (Merrifield 1959, Merrifield and Hoogshagen 1961:225).[1] The lineage-clan pattern found in the vacant center, or *paraje*,

1. In the Coatlán, Oaxaca case of Mixe Indians cited by Merrifield and Hoogshagen (1961) they state that the classificatory terms utilizing the criteria of age relative to ego

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The relationship of respect and obedience between parents and children is expected to last throughout life. When a boy reaches the age of eighteen, his parents are expected to provide him with a wife. Wealthier families tend to fulfill this obligation at an earlier age than do poorer families, in which the boy may have to work in the fincas or in the sawmills to acquire the money for his own marriage.

Instruction in sexual behavior and reproduction is not characterized by continuity, as is instruction about work tasks. Children are given no information about sex prior to marriage, and girls remain entirely innocent. They may be pregnant several months before they are aware of what is happening. The complete sexual segregation in work tasks and play during adolescence makes the relationship between sexes strained.

Even after marriage, the parents are concerned with maintaining their child's marital situation, or, if they judge their child's spouse to be incorrigible, to help him get rid of his partner. In the case of women, in particular, parents continue to provide a refuge in case a daughter's husband should die, be sent to prison, or prove incompatible. Parents usually accompany their children if they are called into court, and failure to attend is tantamount to admitting the guilt of the child.

In successful marriages, the parents-in-law are equivalent to parents and are called "mother" and "father." The parents of both spouses attend the life crisis ceremonies of their children and grandchildren. Grandparents provide support and care for grandchildren if their parents should die or remarry.

When parents reach the age of about sixty-five, they are no longer expected to work actively. A man will then distribute all of his land and animals among his children. He will expect to be taken care of by all of his children, but special responsibility falls on the youngest who will inherit the house. Sometimes aged parents move from one of their children's houses to another, spending a few months or years with each. Children are expected to pay for any curing ceremonies necessary in their parents' old age and to provide a good funeral appropriate to their wealth. Failure to do this incurs loss of respect with the neighbors and collateral relatives of the deceased. If the parents die after they have distributed their possessions, the crisis following the death is minimal. At the funeral, mature children of a deceased parent exhibit to the community their filial respect.

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602 476 626 Kinship is one of several bases for recruiting reciprocal or cooperative labor. Table 19 compares kinship with nonkinship-defined work groups in terms of the kinds of exchanges, the type of work done, the time span permitted for reciprocity, and the sanctions against failure to reciprocate.

TABLE 19. Labor Exchanges of Kinship- and Nonkinship-Defined Groups

Conditions	*Within household*	*Beyond household, within community*	
		With kin (ritual, compadre, affinal and consanguineal)	*With nonkin*
Interchange	"Cooperation"—reciprocity based on implicit understandings	Reciprocity—explicit, defined by traditional expectations	Reciprocity—explicit, often defined by contract as well as tradition
Sanctions	Authority of elder member, male in men's work group, female in women's work group	Authority of elders of bilaterally-extended kin group; Recourse to cabildo if no strong elder	Informal—fear of gossip of neighbors; formal—reliance on local judges and president or recourse to district courts
Time Span	Extended, indefinite	Extended, usually some defined limit on repeated tasks (harvest); no limit for nonrepeated tasks (housebuilding)	Immediate return expected, or explicitly stated time allowance
Kind of Task	Pottery-making, milpa agriculture, care of cattle, preparation of food	Ploughing, cultivating, harvesting, firing pottery, housebuilding	Same.

593 476 423 621 [606] Fathers and sons, or sons-in-laws may work together on family-owned property. Because all men can acquire ejido land after marriage, and since 47 percent of the households claim to have only this land, the cooperative tie between fathers and sons is not based on inheritance. If they work well together, they may continue to cooperate after the son has become independent. Father and sons, brothers and brothers-in-law are expected to cooperate with each other in building a house, rethatching a roof, and threshing wheat. In the case of house-building or maintenance, they must pay for a substitute if they are unable to fulfill the obligation.

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761 might be. The father or closest male kin of the dead person is careful to
627 recount all the consultations he has had with curers, both to absolve him-
753 self of the guilt of neglect or unconscious witchcraft and to search for the true culprit.

764 A proper burial with holy water, flowers, grave offerings, and prayers as-
775 sures the survivors that the soul of the deceased will rest and his bones will lie in peace. Lacking any of these features, the dead will disturb the living, as is recounted below:

During the revolution, many were buried without a funeral or without blessed water. On Thursday, the bones burn and cry. You can still see a blue flame rising above the old graveyard on Thursday. You can find money that the ancestors left there, but you have to go at night to dig it up.

An important safeguard to ensure that the soul will lie in peace is burial among people with whom the deceased lived. When a married adult dies,
[593] he is buried with his dead spouse. If he had two dead spouses, he is buried with the first spouse on the right hand and the second on the left. A child
[603] is buried with the grandparents of the household in which he lived—that is, if he lived with his mother's parents he is buried with them, and if with the father's parents, then with them. When people know that they
[763] are going to die, they express their preference as to where they wish to be
[593] buried. Usually they will elect to be buried between their dead parents, but
[608] if they were unhappy with their parents, they might choose a padrino or
[604] uncle. If dissatisfied in its resting place, a soul, even when properly buried, cannot find peace and wanders back to the house. Fearing this, relatives try to comply with the wishes of the dead.

My grandfather used to say that he wanted to be buried between his mother and father. But when he was about to die, he said, "I don't want to be buried there because my father beat me. He will continue beating my soul. I want to go on the side [of the cemetery]. Please don't bury me near my parents." My father said, "All right, we will put you on the side."

764 The funeral must meet the expectations of the community as well as
554 those of the deceased and his relatives. The mature children of a man who
626
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dies are expected to give a funeral appropriate to his station in life and his wealth, as is expressed in the following account:

When my father got sick, he told his wife not to put him in a black box. He had heard a story that when the dead man is in a black box, his spirit cannot see. He wanted to be in a white box. He told this to his brother. But his brother wanted to get a black box. He bought one black box for three hundred pesos when my father died, because it is the custom of the pueblo to bury adults in a black box. The people would talk if we did not buy a good box because they knew he had animals. We spent six hundred pesos for the funeral. We presented the body in church for a mass. We had a singing mass for thirty pesos, and the box cost three hundred pesos. We had a common meal of beef in the house, and we spent two hundred and sixteen pesos for three garrafones of liquor. Each of his sons contributed sixty pesos for that. If we hadn't given him a good funeral, people would have said, "His children are very lax not to buy a good box to bury their father."

The padre says that all bodies should be presented in the church. He says if you don't have money, you don't have to pay for the mass. But we are ashamed if we don't pay because he does work for us. He charged only twenty-five pesos because he said my father worked hard for the town. We took a collection from all the people who were there, and it amounted to one hundred and thirty pesos. We paid the padre for the mass and gave a contribution. All the people in whose houses he had passed when he was alive came to see him. They said, "Ah, his children gave a very nice box for their father."

If all of the family is poor, no one talks if the funeral is not a good one. But if there is anything that can be sold, it will have to be to make a good funeral. When my father died, he had eighteen horses. We had to sell one, and each of the children gave one hundred pesos.

Some say the souls play the harp and drink liquor when they arrive in heaven. On All Soul's Day they visit the village where they had lived and where they are known. For each member of the household who had died, a specific portion of food is laid out. Special likes are catered to: a bottle of liquor will be set on the table for a deceased father, soda pop for children

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642 621 626 554 The statement of functions of the civil officials as codified in the state constitution contrasts with that of local informants first of all in the brevity of the latter. This indicates the lack of functional specificity in the role as conceived by Indians in contrast to its Spanish-derived model. The latitude of acceptable performance in the role is best indicated by the statements concerning why a man is relieved of office. A man might be dismissed because he "fights a lot," because he "gets drunk and fights," or because he "steals a lot." The qualification "a lot" suggests the difficulty of actually ridding the town of an incumbent who has caused difficulties while in office. There are only two posts in which deposition actually has occurred: those of president and fiscal. Both these posts represent mediating roles between local and national interest groups. The deposition of the president Augustín recounted in Chapter 9 indicates the kind of community action which can be mobilized. Significantly, failure to perform prescribed duties is not mentioned.

621 554 Second, it is the presence of the officials, not their specific obligations, which is of significance in the local context. "Sitting" therefore is a central and active duty. Each morning at about seven o'clock the officials gather to sit on the benches on the porch of the town hall. The president and síndico sit inside at the table. They return at six in the evening to sit again. The line-up of the civil authorities at their appointed places each morning and evening is a statement of social control. Their presence gives evidence of an authority ready to act against offenders.

A third feature of contrast is that the local statement of functions includes many of the ceremonial activities of the civil officials. Thus the president has the significant duties of seeing that the banners pass into the town hall at the time of a fiesta, and of going to the house of the alférez when the banners are moved in procession. The holiness of office is associated with the holy symbol of the banners. For the police, collecting the 20-peso portions of meat when a bull is butchered for ceremonial meals is as significant as apprehending criminals.

Ritual Behavior

In ritual behavior, the status of officials is projected in role performance. Relative position in each ceremonial setting is an index to rank.

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guests. They borrowed benches from neighbors; they cut juniper and prepared the resting place for the sacred banner; they borrowed seed-gourd rattles and two tables, and they adorned the house with pine branches and fruit. In the afternoon, all the relatives, the compadres, and the neighbors were invited. Two alisiles were appointed (this term is probably a Tzeltal rendition of alguacil, *in Spanish an office corresponding to high bailiff or peace officer). The alisiles were charged with watching to see that neither the new alférez nor either of his two guitarists got too drunk to carry out his functions.*

The two alisiles called out the women to dance, first asking permission of the woman speaker. The dance was the most important act in the set of performances on the third day, which was sometimes referred to as the "afternoon of the big dance." The dance was a highly charged event because the women were for the first time cast in a public role. Fear and shame, the two conditioning mechanisms of socialization in Tzo?ontahal, had to be overcome when the women became involved in the dance. Special precautions were taken: the alisil formally requested the woman speaker to take the women out:

Lord, women who nursed us, give pardon with God, the Virgin Mother. Give holy pardon mother and father with God and with the Virgin Mother. We have gathered here, collected together your child, your offspring, where it is not very pretty, not very flavorful, at the door of your holy poverty, holy suffering, for the holy office, the holy prayer. Again our clay, our mud comes to speak here to the mothers who nursed, who give us fear and embarrassment.

Then the alfereses took off their hats and kerchiefs and brought them to the women. This act was described by an informant: "The women cover their heads with the kerchief and put on the hat. The girls want the handkerchief and the hat of their husbands in order not to be ashamed to be seen by a boy. They want the kerchief to hide their faces. If they do not want the hat, it is when they are mature women and do not have shame. The wives of the alfereces do not have shame because it is their job." The use of the kerchief which was draped over their head, partially covering

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The belief in power derived from animal spirits was probably influenced by the Toltec belief in nahualism, or transformation of people after death into animals (Calnek 1962:22). The Toltec belief originated in the period of Mexican influence but had many local indigenous manifestations (Foster 1944). The integration of the two systems of power was brought about by calendar priests controlling the distribution of animal spirits (Calnek 1962:19). The degree of retention of calendrical knowledge and of belief in witchcraft gives us one of the best indices of acculturation in the area.[2] In Tzo?ontahal there is no remnant of calendar divination for ceremonial or predictive use. However, witchcraft based on belief in animal spirits continues to be an important factor in the contest for power. The technique of secrecy, of presenting a united front in the face of attempts by the outside Ladinos to tamper with the local social control system, persists to this day in the town.

An endemic problem in communities dominated by belief in witchcraft is control over the evil power of witches. The traditional control system in Tzo?ontahal operated through the guardianship of three sets of power-holders who checked up on each other: the ancestors, the curers, and the judges. The guardianship of the ancestors consisted in preventing any child possessed of a swayohel from the devil from growing up to abuse his power and in keeping any evil spirits from entering the town. The curers,

the Indians, whether out of cowardice or deceit, withdraw their accusation or claims, so that it is impossible to convict the evildoers for punishment; and for lack of sufficient proof they cannot be punished, or if there is enough basis to put them in prison, they sometimes disappear and flee to another jurisdiction and hide, denying their place of origin or changing their name.

2. In Oxchuk, calendar experts with the ability to divine the future still set the days for carrying out Catholic fiestas according to the twenty-day Maya ceremonial cycle. Each of the spirits symbolizing the twenty days wielded the power of good or evil. This provided the basis for predicting. When Villa Rojas studied the town in the 1940s, elders of patrilineal lineages controlled the behavior of members by causing sickness brought by their *lab*, or animal spirit (Villa Rojas 1947). In San Pedro Chenalhó, the principales exercise power through their *wayhel*, or animal spirit (Guiteras Holmes 1961). Nahuales of leaders of the patrilineages and principales are feared and respected in Larraínzar, although there is a growing discontent with their oppressive control (Holland 1963). Men believed to have thirteen nahuales figure as guardians and avengers for individuals in Pinola society, although the Indians of this community no longer have a hierarchy of civil offices through which their prestige can be publicly validated (Hermitte 1964).

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as the direct agents of the ancestors, guarded the streets of their own side of the dual division. The judges, with the supervision of the principales, were responsible for guarding against the abuse of power by the curers or others possessing a swayohel in their review of witchcraft cases in the town hall. The three sets of functionaries—ancestors, curers, and judges—are classified in a lexicon of role function in the stem *me? . . tat . . ,* common to the terms applied to them, me?tiktatik, me?iltatil, and me?eštatel.[3]

The system of control over the use of power has been in a state of uneasy tension. In a series of incidents recounted below, the growing suspicion that the judges and the principales were not countering the witches because of their fear of falling victim to them, and that the curers themselves were exercising the witchcraft becomes apparent.

In the following case, the system of checks and balances was upset by the entry into the presidency in 1940 of Mam Nicolás, the leading curer of Allannantik. Nicolás combined the skills of operating in the traditional culture with those of dealing with the Ladino world. Despite the fact that he was a graduate of the boarding school operating in the town in the 1930s, which had far more extensive effects in acculturation as well as formal education than any prior school, he practiced curing. The case is recounted by Ceferino, the scribe:

Formerly the dead president Mam Nicolás left at midday from the town hall and went to his house where he ate a meal. A neighbor, Francisco, came to talk to him. They drank a half a liter of trago, and then began to drink a second and got drunk. They began to say goodbye, and Francisco left Nicolás' house. When Nicolás saw that Francisco went out, he grabbed his shotgun. He saw that Francisco was now far away, and he fired many shots. One got him right in his back. When Francisco felt it, he shouted. The police heard him and went to get the judges who came to see also. His [Francisco's] wife came. She raised his head and cried when she saw he was dead. An elder sister brought a new mat to carry him.

3. The suffixes *-el,* and *-tik* refer to pronominal forms, as in "you judges" and "our ancestors." *-il* is an article, as in "the curers." In prayer, the ancestors may be addressed in the second person, or the judges may be referred to with the first-person-plural possessive, but these forms are rare in those contexts.

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ginal to the community, either a foreign Indian, as in the case of Augustín, or a Ladino, as in the cases of the secretary and schoolmaster described below. The only indigenous candidate for the role was recently killed. It provokes too much envy for someone socialized in the community; fear of being accused and even killed as a witch or a power-seeker is justified by several such precedents. Those with the skills to become caciques have until recently been effectively incorporated in the existing hierarchy as firmanetik.

Second, the cacique is a gatekeeper, channeling information, goods, and services from the outside to the members of the community. In this capacity, he prefers to pose as a benefactor when he may actually be no more than the distributor of government welfare goods and services.[4]

Third, the role of cacique is one in which the incumbent operates in a local sphere, but depends upon a network of compadrazgo and professional ties outside of the community to assure his position in the community. He must be sufficiently aware of the local idiom in order to avoid making enemies.

Finally, the role is monopolistic. This results in part from the fact that the outside world prefers to deal with a single representative for reasons of expediency. However, new governmental agents are more and more dealing directly with Indians, a factor which has shaken the position of the cacique. The monopolistic quality of the position also stems from the fact that the profit to be gleaned from the community is small. A Ladino from a neighboring town commented that it was worth the time of only one man to exploit an Indian community of the size of Tzo'ontahal. The extractable profit is diminishing as the Indians become more aware of their rights.

The change in character and range of activities of local caciques is illustrated by the recent careers of two residents of Tzo'ontahal. In the 1950s and until 1964, the Ladino secretary, Don Ramon, had filled the role of cacique. He took advantage of this role not only by collecting a salary and a percentage of court fees, but also by earning money for using his influence in Ladino official circles outside the community. He lent money for interest and subsidized some enterprises such as growing cabbages with Indian partners.

4. Goldrich (1965) points to this tactic of politicians who distribute government goods as though they were their own gifts.

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159 civil officials, not of me"). He identifies himself with the Indians in the
875 fight against the competitive trucking cooperative ("Those who are with
563 him [Don Ramon] are traitors to the pueblo. They are being exploited by
177 him"). While he does not accuse Ramon's wife directly of witchcraft he
178 implies this in saying that people sign their candidate's nomination peti-
[754] tion for president because they are afraid Juana will use witchcraft. This is
[626] a characteristic mode of attacking one's enemies in the town. He claims credit for all of the innovations in the town which have won public approval—the highway, the water supply, electricity, and so forth.

622 The profit motive is inadequate to explain why Ladinos want to play
875 the role of cacique in these corporate Indian communities. One must seek
563 for an explanation instead in the social status they gain. While their jobs
177 are limited and usually frustrating and they can never be completely inte-
178 grated into the community, political activities offer them a larger arena in which they can derive personal satisfaction. The contrast between the schoolmaster's position in Tzo'ontahal before he became a political leader and his position after finding local supporters illustrates this. In the early days of his residence in town, when he built a chicken coop which extended a few feet beyond the grounds allotted to the schoolhouse, some Indians threatened to kill him. In 1957, I saw him trying to summon a policeman from the town hall, which was adjacent to the schoolhouse, to remove a boulder from the path so that a visiting friend could pass in his automobile. No one heeded his urgent shouts or the whistle he used to call children to school, although they were well aware of what he wanted. But by 1965 there was not a single important transaction which did not require consultation with the schoolteacher. Campesinos from as far as Villa Las Rosas came to request his advice and his help in approaching government agents. In projecting his political role, he gained support for projects
[653] which were of interest to him. When he had succeeded in getting the gov-
312 ernment to install water pipes and electricity, he talked the civil authori-
365 ties into building a kiosk, or bandstand, in the plaza. This was a fulfill-
345 ment of his ambition to make the town over in the image of a colonial Spanish pueblo. His final statement in the speech quoted above, "Today we see a kiosk, tomorrow we will have a telephone, telegraph, and a factory!" reveals the symbolic significance it had for him.

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578 793 794 273 *to cook their meal in the yard of the church. They threatened to beat the priest with the wood, and he retreated into the church. He later announced that he would not give mass, or weddings, or baptism. We did not mind that he did not give the mass or would not give weddings, but the people were frightened if he would not give baptism. The mayordomos had a meeting, and they agreed to give up drinking in the church if the priest would continue to give baptism, but they would no longer care for the pigs or bring wood for him without payment. We pay him fifteen* [465] *pesos for an ordinary mass and forty pesos for a singing mass, so he should pay us for help. The priest was in agreement with the mayordomos.*

[264] As a result of this edict, the drinking has stopped and the mayordomos no longer eat the common meal in the church yard. Drinking was an act linked to eating, since the round of liquor served before the meal was "to prepare the stomach," and the drink after the meal was "to wash down the food." The shift to the house of the cofrade was a ready alternative in this community where the household is a recognized ritual domain.

793 794 178 The priest's control over the church has extended to control over the donation boxes and the saints' images. He now receives the money donated to the saints and does not permit a public accounting of the funds. Because of this, the civil officials accuse him of stealing some of the money. A recent incident recounted below by one of the prayer-reciters led to even more severe censure:

793 796 626 578 178 *The bishop visited our church, and when he looked under the silk robes of the Virgin Santa Lucia he found a wooden dress covered with gold paint. He told the priest to have the cloth dress removed. The people were very upset by this since they are very proud of the dresses bought for the Virgin. One of the prayer-reciters dreamed that the Virgin appeared before her in tears, saying she did not want to appear nude in public. We [the group of prayer-reciters] went to see the bishop to demand that the Virgin should wear her dress in church and that the priest be sent out of the town. The bishop refused. He said the Virgin did not feel cold because she was just a statue. Ha! How could she not feel cold?*

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The issue of the Virgin's clothing has increased the attacks on the priest. These have been aired in public meetings which take place on Sunday. Opposition to the priest has shifted from the old cofrades to the young leadership of the pueblo, men who wish to extend internal control over the church as well as the town hall. They tried to enlist the fiscal's help in getting rid of the priest, but he refused to cooperate. The president's brother, who serves as town treasurer, recounts the following exchange he had with the priest:

I saw Padre Juan take money from the box when I was mayordomo in the church. All of us mayordomos went to talk with him. I asked him how much money was turned in during the fiesta.

"The madres [*lay sisters*] *know," he said, "I don't."*

He called them, and they said, "We haven't counted the money. Come tomorrow."

The priest was very angry that we asked for an account. Pablo [*the fiscal*] *was too afraid to talk with him. When we left the church, I told Pablo, "You are in charge of the church. Why didn't you demand an account of the money in front of the church? We never got an account."*

Then we began to fight. Padre Juan doesn't want to leave the town. He has it too good here. He has a good yard with many fruit trees and a nice house. The Ladinos in Teopisca don't let him stay in their convento overnight. They are sharp, those damned Ladinos! We pay the padre thirty pesos every Sunday. Before he lived here, we used to have good music and more firecrackers for fiestas. Now he wants to stop all this. He was the one who ordered that all the money be collected. We wanted to go buy a gross of firecrackers. He said, "Why do you want firecrackers? It is the mass that has value. The saints don't want firecrackers or music."

He is very smart, the padre. He wants to keep the money for himself. Now we just get two firecrackers each morning of the fiesta and two in the evening. In Teopisca, they fire dozens of firecrackers. Here what is left over from the contributions for the fiesta remains in the box, and he takes it.

I went to get new clothing for the saint. In Comitán they wanted two

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made explicit in the contrasts they make between their conditions and those of the migratory mestizo laborers who work in the sawmills and fincas in the area. They comment on the fact that these workers have no political representation and that they and their children are illiterate and do not attend school. The significant factor is that the Indians of the corporate communities not only have advantages over the mestizo worker, but they perceive these advantages and are acting in terms of them. The preservation of community traditions is seen as a means of retaining community-owned assets and of maintaining a sense of self which is threatened or destroyed when the individual Indian enters into the national society.

The rules of strategy for moving in the direction of change are a transformation of the rules of the game that the Indians hve played in the four and a half centuries since the Conquest. The overall strategy is still defensive and aimed at preserving local independence, but their tactics include new skills acquired from Ladinos. In opposing the old power elite of the curing hierarchy, the present leadership uses the same tactics of the witch-hunt that their opponents used in the past to punish deviates, but they are beginning to confront them openly when sorcery is suspected. Leaders of the new cooperatives state that their aim is to increase opportunities for the whole community, not to make individual profit.

Because the conflict has been contained within community boundaries, the statement of goals remains the same. These goals include the retention of control by local leaders over judgment of guilt or innocence, in ceremonial affairs, and by all townspeople over land. This retention of local control is the key feature of a moving equilibrium in a model of change that puts the emphasis on continuous adjustments and adaptations. In the usual models for discussing modernization, the confrontation is conceived as one between the indigenous society and the outsider representing western influence. In Tzo?ontahal, young leaders within the community have confronted old in the stated interest of preserving tradition. Occasionally they may make alliances with the old leaders as in the conflict with the priest.

These "shifts in the focus of political power within a given system" (Leach 1964:9) are the prelude to structural change. Tzo?ontahal as a case

support of whatever is said—repeating the final phrase of the person conversing or injecting supportive statements such as "indeed, indeed," or "so it is." In the dance of the alfereces' wives, for example, women were the model of deference, moving in a self-contained pattern before the assembled guests, with slow, tiny steps, eyes downcast, a shawl covering their heads on which they wore their husbands' ceremonial hats.

Through recruitment procedures, alternation and linkage in official roles, and leadership validated by age and service in lower positions—principles applying to role relations in all institutions—Tzo'ontahal has remained an integrated community. There is a high degree of stereotyping in behavior from one institution to another, and norms of behavior are the same for public as for private roles. However, a remarkably high homicide rate and open conflict in all of the institutional settings indicate basic sources of disruption.

Since 1960 the rate of homicide in town has increased from an average of 1 every 2 years to an average of 5 or 6 per year. Table 29 indicates the role relationships of killer to victim in 37 of over 70 homicides occurring between 1937 and 1964. The highest incidence of homicide (7 cases) occurred between brothers and brothers-in-law. Male siblings comprise the closest cooperating group. Brothers work together in the milpa until the father dies or divides his property among his children during his lifetime. Bilateral inheritance with equal division of land and houses among female as well as male offspring means that brothers-in-law are potential competitors for the same limited resources. Friction arising among brothers and brothers-in-law does not come from the principle of equal inheritance, but rather because of the fact of differing responsibilities and expenses within the family. For example, the child who has remained with the parents and thus assumes the burden of care for them in their declining years often feels that he should inherit a greater share. The disputes arise in the decisions concerning how much this disadvantage should be weighted. The suppression of overt competition may in part explain the homicidal acts. Although the tensions in fact stem from suppressed economic competition, they are translated into witchcraft accusations as soon as anyone in the family becomes ill. Violence against a witch is condoned by the community and provides a channel for latent hostility. Once the accusation has

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Evaluations of Behavior

121 The evaluation of individual behavior is related to role categories, but is not circumscribed by them. Some behavior is universally prescribed, and judgments include all categories of people. This is particularly notable in behavior related to the moral code. Etiquette requires an ability to respond appropriately not only to individual "others" in a setting, but to a plurality of "others" categorized in special roles. This ability to respond to others in a setting and to anticipate what their responses will be has been characterized as "complex syntactic behavior" by Hebb and Thompson (1954). Analysis of complex syntactic behavior must go beyond the summation of dyadic interaction within role sets to exploring the shared values and norms on which judgments are made and expectations predicated.

Judgments of behavior are cast in terms of (1) morality, or the acceptance of prescribed behavior, (2) etiquette, or the acceptance of preferred actions, and (3) competence, or the effectiveness of performance. In gossip, in court cases, in allocating roles of responsibility, in judging professional competence, the assessment of a person is made with reference to his action in past incidents. A person is what he does, and the evaluation [192] [193] of a person's repetitive acts (called *yobra* incorporating the Spanish loan word *obra* and the Tzeltal possessive form *y*) encompasses a personal history.

196 577 *Morality*. Judgments concerning the moral value of a person are summarized in terms of states of the heart. A person who behaves well is said to be of "very good heart" in contrast to someone of "another heart." A good man is "one-hearted" if he takes other people into account. The description may be put in the negative, as "one who does not know how to seek disputes." The expression "two-hearted" is comparable to what English speakers mean by "two-faced."

577 626 Violations of the moral code are differentiated from violations of the code of convention or etiquette in that the former are said to indicate lack of fear and the latter are said to indicate lack of shame. These two definitions of social transgression point to the major socializing technique of the community: promoting a sense of shame and fear.

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The following list of moral transgressions is roughly ordered in terms of the egregiousness of the crime: witchcraft, theft of cattle, theft of corn, "talking with" a woman (this is a euphemism for having an affair), having more than one wife, killing, and disrespect to parents. There is a fair amount of consistency in the rank order given by different informants. Of five people questioned, all ranked witchcraft first, and theft, without qualification as to what was stolen, second. Subjects questioned differentiated the crime of "talking with" a woman according to the status of the woman —it was worse to have relations with a married woman than with an unmarried girl or with a widow. Killing was listed late or not at all by some because it is assumed that the killer has cause unless the contrary is proved. The dead man is referred to as the guilty one. It is considered worse to kill a consanguineous relative than an affinal relative or a nonrelative. One man remarking on an incident in which a person lost his bull said: "It was a punishment of God for killing his father. If it had been his stepfather, it would be different." Wanton killing is said to be absent in the pueblo, and something that the kurik of the colonias do. The three murders in the past ten years resulting from barroom brawls between "friends" have not dispelled this notion.

Disrespect shown to parents is considered a serious violation of morality. A boy who refuses to listen to his father cannot expect to receive the protection and support of his parents, usually offered a child throughout their lifetime, or of the community. If the son abuses his father verbally or physically in public, the father is supported in whatever action he takes. One father, whose son kicked him in one of the local bars, drew applause when he made the sign of the cross in two deep gashes with his machete on his son's forehead. To beat one's father or mother is a great sin, but to beat one's wife is tolerated, particularly if it is done in drunkenness. If a man other than the husband beats a woman for any cause, she may reciprocate by beating him in court "before the eyes of the judges." One woman who was awarded this privilege when her husband's brother beat her said, "If he were my own husband, it would be all right for him to beat me."

The good man is "of one heart" and reveals it by his humility ("very soft heart"). The rules for demonstrating this are given by an old man who is frequently asked to be a nakawane in his section of the dual divi-

577 682 in the following statement by a man who admitted to me that he had killed two men:

The padre said that those who kill will get killed. The one who kills also receives all the guilt of his victim and will have to pay for it in the after-world. But my father said that when he was a policeman, there was a man in Tejonero who killed for nothing when he got drunk. He always carried a knife and would kill anyone around. However, he lived until he was very old. Therefore I do not believe the padre.

577 775 Concern about the afterworld does not act as a deterrent to action in this world.

783 794 Most men ignore the priest's attempts to persuade them to go to confession. Women, especially the prayer-reciters, confess and take communion. Their confessions, according to the priest, are a recitation of the sins of their husbands or their neighbors.

293 577 Drinking is often given as a defense for failing to meet standards of behavior. While this serves to excuse minor infractions, a man is supposed to be responsible for his actions even when drunk. When one policeman started a fight in public, an elder judge commented to my informant:

Look at that, younger brother! I drink liquor when I am very drunk, but I do not fight either my elders or minors. When I passed as president formerly, I used to enter the cabildo, and I spoke well to the judges even if I was drunk. One time I came to your house very drunk and you were half drunk, but you did not say anything to me, nor did I. You did not fight. Thus I walk well. I never fight, nor have I gone to prison, and it is because I give respect to my elders and to my juniors.

Reflecting on this advice, my informant added:

And so it is with me also. I have drunk a great deal in Ahk'olnantik [the opposite section from where he lives] both at day and at night. Whoever speaks to me tells me to go drink with them a little liquor, and sometimes I give them a drink or I take them where they sell liquor and we drink. But I never fight, and I am able to drink wherever I like.

626 273 431 The community has developed techniques for compensating failure to meet behavioral norms. The most frequently used is an offering of the

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"gift of the gods," liquor, to the party whose interests have been slighted. This is done in the case of a suitor who is asking for a woman of the other side of the dual division; he gives the bachelors of that side a garrafón of liquor in compensation for the loss of a potential mate. Liquor has become a substitute for the sacrifice of a child by a man being initiated into the curing profession. Informal offerings of liquor may be made between neighbors or relatives who have been fighting with each other. Liquor is a kind of universal social solvent in disputes, and figures importantly in court cases which are always terminated in a drinking session.

Another technique is simply a payment in money to compensate for damages. In some homicide cases, the payment of "blood money" has compensated the family of the victim to avoid legal action. This is never done, however, if the community agrees that the victim was a witch. Payment of fines in court is another such form of compensation. These payments or offerings minimize the bloodshed or personal involvement in conflictual relations. Payment by the man judged guilty will ensure his reincorporation into his customary place in the community without stigma.

While it is impossible to elicit from informants a theory of roles, it is possible to formulate the principles underlying roles. These are deduced from behavioral observations and from evaluations made of the performances of others. They can be summarized in the following propositions:

1. There is a clear separation between role and role-bearer. This is seen most clearly in the passage through civil and religious offices with a minimum of "halo" effect. It is also found in the situation of household officials whose authority in directing affairs within a household ceases when the ceremony in which they officiate is over. The separation ensures flexibility in a closed social system, enabling people to shift from one role to another. It also permits continuity in a system which requires an almost complete turnover of personnel each year.

2. Function performed is separate from role in which it is performed. This applies even in those roles which are designated on the basis of the most important function required of the performer, for example woman speaker, liquor measurer, and basket carrier. All of

as lawyers. The defendant is sometimes accompanied by supporters who feel that he has a case. The failure of parents to accompany a defendant, regardless of his age, is attributed to their shame over their child's misbehavior and their own failure to train him properly. The judge does not limit himself to passing judgment but also counsels the defendant as to how he should behave.

The town hall is usually shut and locked at noon unless some business requires more time. In the evening about six, the officials return to take their same posts. They sit with their arms drawn inside their woolen jackets for warmth. After a half an hour they drift home. People rely on the presence of officials rather than particular actions to maintain social control, and it is their appearance at regular hours that assures the villagers that the town is being well run.

Local autonomy depends primarily on retaining social control functions. Civil officials try to settle disputes locally and avoid the entry of Ladino officials from the departmental capital, although the judges and president will threaten the defendant with taking the case to the department if they cannot get compliance. The number of cases referred to the capital has been increasing since 1950 as Table 32 shows. In 1951 the federal government began to fine local officials who failed to report homicide cases and accidental death. The local officials complied, but departmental courts were unable to bring action in over half the cases. No action was taken in 72 cases, or 54 percent, in comparison with 62 cases, or 46 percent, in which action was taken. Domestic cases, except for one of adultery, are adequately handled in local courts and do not appear in the departmental records. The trend shows an increasing number of cases of crimes against persons in comparison to crimes against property, an index to the breakdown in social control processes.

The Church

The church has been built and on two occasions rebuilt—when the tower was struck by lightning—with funds collected locally from household heads. Damage to the church was attributed to the patron saint of the neighboring town of Oxchuk who, the people say, was fighting with their patroness, Santa Lucía. The townspeople feel that they own the

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The assumption that leisure is a concept unique to highly civilized societies is denied by peasant behavior in this community and many others like it in which the members are masters of the greater part of their time. What differentiates their scheduling of leisure-time activities from that of most western societies is that theirs is based on community decisions rather than individual predilections and that it is set in the frame of sacred rather than secular performances. Community standards are most notable in the way people dress for fiestas: women wear their newest embroidered blouses; their hair is neatly braided with ribbons. Men wear a kotončʉ with their cleanest shirt and pants. The children, except for the youngest, wear clothes like the adults'. Villagers "care for" the celebration by sitting on their porches, greeting neighbors, smoking and talking. When a public performance is held in the church or plaza, they participate as observers. Arduous work of any kind is proscribed. Special foods are prepared and served at regular mealtimes. A special mark of all days of fiesta is the serving of fermented corn beverage. Meat or chicken is more likely to be served on Sundays and holidays than on other days.

Timing as a Strategy in Interpersonal Relations

The preferred mode of action is "slow and soft." This applies to motion, especially in rituals, as well as to the scheduling of actions in a series of negotiations. The people are sensitive to the use of time in bargaining as an index to the relative resources of the negotiators. Withholding power in the market gives a marked price advantage in the sale of crops. Sale in advance of harvest means a loss of one-quarter to one-half of the price which could be gained if the crop was sold after it was cut, and corn sometimes doubles in value if withheld for six months or more. Interest as a time payment for the use of money is accepted on the basis that the borrower could put it to work. There is no feeling against the evil of usury, although the rates are relatively high in town—five percent per month.

This understanding of time as an indicator of relative strength extends to social functions. Time serves as an interval to build confidence on the part of both parties entering into contractual arrangement. In the betrothal, both parties are prepared for a long series of visits before the suit

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programs in the interest of "civilizing" the Indians. This formulation involved a basic contradiction between the goal of moving into regional and national networks and that of keeping the old autonomy and independence of the corporate community. He never had to face that contradiction. Unable to gain adherents other than the small group of profit-sharers in the cooperative he organized, he was killed by opponents within the community.

The Family and Household

The core of the traditional culture lay in the local power hierarchies patterned on the familial model of age-ordered paternal authority institutionalized in the me?iltatil. The me?iltatil of the household have provided a flexible institution for adjusting conflict within the kin group. Their role in directing ritual performances preserves a sense of continuity in life cycle changes.

The institutionalized authority of the elders has not been upset by the trend toward residence based on nuclear families, which is an adjustment to the pressure of limited space in the town center. Kinship ties are continually reinforced by rituals that draw together the me?iltalil as sponsors of ceremonies marking baptism, marriage, and death. This group of sponsoring relatives has absorbed the institution of compadrazgo, adding compadres to the network of affinally-and bilaterally-related kin. The procedures for adjusting conflict among members of the household and extended family networks reinforce the authority of the elders. When adjustive processes in the house and court "arrangements" and in curing ceremonies fail, the only recourse is for one of the disputants to leave the community or commit homicide.

Ceremonies within the household provide a model for the rules of the game that apply to adjustive behavior in the community. The household officials introduce new officials into their role, teaching them the prayers and directing the proceedings. Their authority depends upon age and prestige acquired in office. The me?iltatil, as the elders of the family, are the direct link with the ancestors. They and the nakawane provide the strongest force for preserving the ways of the ancestors.

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was channeled along existing lines of competition. During my stay in the community from 1964 to 1966, most conflicts were attributed to economic competition between the two trucking cooperatives. Along with this, the waning of the position of the principales has undermined the confidence of the people in the system of checks and balances in which the principales watched over the judges, the judges watched over the curers, the curers watched over the people to see that no one brought in evil, and the ancestors watched over everyone. Curers are more and more often accused of witchcraft and are frequent victims of homicide. The sense that they are the guardians of the pueblo and the agents of the ancestors is nearly dead. They are consulted only because the people feel that, because of the evil in them, they can fight the evil caused by others.

The shift in power from the old leaders to the new has not been accompanied by a shift in ideological allegiance. The new leaders cannot offer the security the people felt when they were living in the eyes of the ancestors. The curers remain as a powerful group because of their claims of being able to fight evil, but there is no longer a legitimate authority controlling their use of destructive forces.

A system of authority based on rule by elders is a structural correlative of a behavior pattern in which people act out the ways of the ancestors. This applies to the schematized behavior contained in rituals and in traditional productive activities. The ideology of a seniority-based prestige system persists at the explicit level at the same time that behavioral changes in contradiction to this are occurring.

Social control in a system of behavior based on what was done in the past depends upon the belief that people are carrying out their lives "in the eyes of the ancestors." Ritual behavior in Tzo?ontahal seems to confirm this, but in view of the waning belief in the presence of the ancestors and the loss of confidence in their agents, the curers, this behavior is a kind of social lie designed to perpetuate the old code of morality. In their everyday behavior, people no longer act on the same premises. The social lie is perpetuated because the people who enjoyed power in the old social system—the curers and the elders—do not wish to relinquish it. It will last only so long as they can find successors, and with the abolition of the recruitment through alfereces, this should not be for long.

128 pairs of individual roles, highly intense in interaction and
571 performed by people who are tied to each other by many clearly defined and extensive rights and duties. (D. Metzger [1960] defines them as highly relational versus lowly relational roles.) The roles at the micro-structural level form one net, and the quality of the joint performance of the individual, of all the roles which belong to him within this net define him as a good or bad person; the roles at the macro-structural level form a separate independent net which defines the individual as a good or bad community member.

128
156 For example, a man can spend his household money in long
571 drinking sessions, and while drunk fight with his brother or beat his wife, which will make him a bad brother and husband. But if he shares the liquor he drinks with other men in his barrio (town division), the same activity will define him as a good neighbor, who is neither selfish nor a miser, but willing to share his
• [626] profits with other men. On the other hand, a man may refuse to pay his limosna to the Church, risk the community gossip and threats of witchcraft, but this would not make him a less respected father, nor influence the relationship with his wife.

361 The Physical Setting of the Villages

The towns are geographically compact, nucleated communities, as opposed to the vacant-town (and ceremonial center) described first by Tax (1937). The town streets form a grid pattern, more symmetrical in the center than at the edges where streets tend to curve following the accidents of the terrain.

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621 Among its duties are those of keeping vital statistics for
659 the National Population Bureau which are sent to the state office,
692 solving cases of adultery and theft, collecting the fiesta and
651 Ejido taxes, keeping the streets clean, building and repairing
363 roads and public buildings, and also taking charge of the local
491 jail. Ayuntamiento officers are also called in to prevent or solve
499 witchcraft cases and give advice and reprimands to misbehaving
344 wives, sons and other relatives when the household or the responsible
754 relatives cannot deal with the case on their own.
626

621 The Ayuntamiento also keeps its own corn field, worked by
423 communal labor, whose crop is sold to collect funds for its own
432 expenses.
434

794 The Mayordomia, or religious body, performs the formal activities on the religious holidays, is the custodian of the sacred objects (rockets, church keys, bells) connected with the Church, and the authority which carries out the tasks required by all of man's peaceful relations with the supernatural on the village level.

They are responsible as a group for the upkeep of the Church building and saint images, and the preparations for and the performance of Church Fiestas, regular church meetings, etc. Among their duties are those of providing meals for the priest while he is in town, helping during mass, contracting musicians and collecting the Church limosna during mass.

621 This structural level lacks monopoly of either of these functions in relation to other less inclusive social units. Social control and religious activity are carried on at the level of the barrio, the extended family, and within the household, and religious activity can be carried on by individuals.

627
578 small; you will leave having paid five or ten pesos. You will forgive each other. If the misdeed is large, then you will give twenty-five or thirty pesos as your fine, so that we can give something to him who has been injured by you. We will cure him, so that he gets well, so that he may not die. Then he also will give pardon. But if we do not cure him, if we do not give medicine to the one you have hit, then you will quarrel, then his heart will be angered. Because here we have two kinds of misdeeds. He who is evil will do [754] witchcraft. He who does not know witchcraft will give pardon. But he who is evil if he sends sickness to you, then if you get sick, if you die, it is because you did not obey the commandment.

I say this because I am a principal, I am a father [of the town]. I advise you so that the town will go forth in happiness, and in happiness we will increase in our gatherings in the town. But if you are evil, we will not increase, our children will not grow, because there are evil people, there is sickness, there is death from him who knows witchcraft. He who does not know it uses bullets and will kill you that way. Why? Because you sent sickness. So I speak to you thus. Happy, in peace, do not quarrel. It is better.

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[754] The important aspect of witchcraft as a sanctioning procedure is in relation to the distribution of wealth in the community.

[454] A man can accumulate a certain amount of money as long as he is willing to share it with others and spend it in culturally accepted ways, such as buying cohetes for a fiesta, giving a house party for the Saint in the house altar and inviting many [186] villagers, etc. But he cannot simply save it without being accused of miserliness; spend it all in building too large or too different a house without being accused of being embarrassed of his Indianess (of which he should be proud); nor can he invest in businesses which are not the traditional economic activities of the Indian without the fierce criticism of his fellow villagers. There is, then, a top limit to the accumulation of wealth imposed not only by the environmental and technological factors, but by

626 556 the few economic alternatives offered to an Indian who wants to live an Indian life among other Indians, in peace. In this sense, Amatenangueros and Aguacatecos are no "penny capitalists" of the type described by Sol Tax (1953). But it is also true that, like the Panajachel Indians, they desire to have more for themselves and their children: money for security against sickness, death, [146] bad crops and other misfortunes. They also want better clothing, more meat in their diet (the amount of animal protein in their diet is extremely small by western standards) and small extra luxuries which have been introduced into their culture, little by little, by the local Ladino merchants: flashlights, mirrors, etc.

627 556 754 [731] Nevertheless, a wealthy man brings upon himself the antagonism of the other villagers, who, in search of a scapegoat during times of stress (such as a village epidemic) would not hesitate to accuse the rich man of being responsible for bringint the misfortune to the town because of his evil spirit, nor hesitate to kill him. Even if people find a man has a good crop, somebody can assume that, because his own crop failed, the other man has "stolen" the soul of his corn or if a man receives a large inheritance, somebody could accuse him of having killed (by witchcraft) the relative from who he inherited it. It takes a good deal of diplomatic skill and a strong control of the sources of gossip to manage to [753] keep oneself clear of such accusations. On the other hand, villagers are afraid of showing excessive wealth (according to community standards) unless they bring upon themselves the other face of witchcraft: supernatural sickness produced by envy. Even

8: Hunt E-4,5 (1958)1962 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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627 556 754 a man in good standing, if he has too many goods or money, may fear witchcraft because he "knows" that he is a good target for the envy of those who, possessing powerful and evil souls (nahuales), decide to bewitch him and make him sick or kill his children or ruin his next crop.

626 754 Thus, the belief in witchcraft operates at two levels: on the one hand the individual lives according to community norms so that he won't be accused of being a witch. On the other hand he lives according to community norms so that he cannot be bewitched.

754 Because witches attack supernaturally, sending out their animal souls while their human body is asleep, it is not possible to know, for certain, the originator of the sickness nor to protect oneself or others from its powers. There are no sorcery spells to counteract it, but people "know" that witches can, sometimes, put "bad medicines" into drinks while a man is drunk or leave little sticks on the road for the victim to step on and acquire the disease which has been sent because of envy. Everybody denies knowing how to bewitch, but everybody suspects others of being able to do it.

[753] One result of this set of beliefs is that the etiology of disease is thought of as being supernatural. Other misfortunes are also explained in metaphysical terms. Sickness is always present in the village, misfortunes do occur which cannot be predicted, and the villager "experiences," then, the effects of witchcraft in everyday life. Therefore, the threat of supernatural

8: Hunt E-4,5 (1958)1962 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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626 754 784 Therefore, the threat of supernatural sanction is powerful as a communal weapon against social deviation.

621 We can see, then, that the structural dynamics of village life are composed of opposing forces. On the one hand, there is a tendency toward egalitarianism which is expressed in the formal organization of political power and the economic life of the village as a unit. On the other hand, there is a tendency toward deviation from the economic norms which is repressed and expressed in the belief system and the sanctioning of deviants. (Obviously, if people would not tend to deviate from the egalitarian norm, witchcraft "specialization" would not be necessary!)

121 There is no society in the world which does not possess criteria for social differentiation. Some criteria are, by nature, universal: the basic biological differences between persons (age, sex) or psychological skills (intelligence, mental deficiency). Some other criteria are culturally determined (age-grade, class, wealth and so on). Even among societies in which the life conditions preclude social stratification, such as the Sirionó, some few cultural criteria of individual social differentiation are always present. When I suggest that Amatenango and 621 571 Aguacatenango tend to be communities which reinforce homogeneity at the economic, political, and cultural levels, I am far from [576] indicating that individuals are not evaluated differentially. In every social situation, even meeting on the street, Amatenangueros and Aguacatecos make social distinctions and determine their relative position with respect to each other: one would call a

621 571 576 man bankil (respect term, "elder brother") the other would be his kiht'zin ("younger brother").

621 561 554 Older men are socially superior to younger ones. A man who has passed many cargos has more authority than one who has not served in the community government. A man with many children in a united family commands more respect than a man whose children are embarrassed of him because he is a trouble-maker. A good 562 561 626 talker is better thought of than a boring drunkard. The same differentiation scale, although using some other criteria, also functions for women. Elder ladies have enough social status to be permitted to laugh in public while young married wives are expected to keep quiet. A woman known as a "good mother-in-law" collects the rewards of praise of other women. A wife who keeps her husband clean and well fed can visit around and be well received, while a lazy housekeeper would not be welcomed in other women's houses who fear of being judged "by the company they keep."

554 555 A constellation of factors, therefore, places the individual in a very particular status position, and his personal 156 621 571 skill can increase his prestige or destroy it. Moreover, the total performance of an individual in the totality of his roles can not only increase his general status and gain the approval of his fellow men, but would be an important factor in saving him from witchcraft accusations. A man can try to control as much labor and capital as possible in order to maximize profits from his work and minimize its consumption, as long as he does not create enemies, and insures his prestige in as many dimensions as possible: he can give advice to conflicting parties rather than

593 888 (e.g., the filial piety which is a basic component of the role of son), and in terms of economic rewards.

592 [183] The ideal pattern is one of reciprocal obligations: an established domestic group "launches into the world" the new domestic groups formed by the male offspring of the household couple, and a well established domestic group is responsible for the welfare of the domestic group from which it originated. Thus, [602] agnatically related domestic groups are expected to perform certain duties with respect to both the domestic group which originate them, and the domestic groups which they originate.

593 888 The concept of mantener (support), meaning to provide for a person's food, shelter and company, is a very important one for the villager. There is no sadder man than the one who has given everything to his sons, who has supported them for many years, and whose sons then refuse the reciprocal duty of caring for him in his old age. Parents who are unsuccessful in keeping one of [826] their married sons living with them are indeed very unhappy. People gossip about them as being "bad people" who did wrong to their children-in-law and mistreated their own. They gossip about the children themselves, accusing them of having a "small [936] heart" and of being envious and selfish. Aguacatecos pity widows (meba' al) and orphans (meba') because "they have nobody to support them." There is nothing as threatening to a couple as not having children, and if this happens, the community looks upon them with commiseration and says: "Poor little people, who is going to support them when they grow old?. . ."

592 593 Thus, the membership of a household changes through time,

591 2. When a couple have no male children, they try to keep a married daughter living with them, as a replacement for the unachieved son. They will also attempt to do this in a case where all the male children have refused to stay with the parents after the initial years of married life.

593 888 [626] Parents who are unsuccessful in keeping a married son living with them when they are old have very little prestige in the community because it usually means that there is some conflict between them, and they are easy targets for village gossip. It also means that they have no "insurance for the aged," that is, no child to support them when they grow too old to work.

591 583 Therefore, a couple with a single daughter still at home will be eager to keep her after marriage, to replace the sons who have gone away. To obtain this, the parents will request, during the pedidas (the visits to arrange a marriage, called "asking visits"), that the groom should "come to the house as a yerno (son-in-law) of theirs, and stay there indefinitely. Only if the groom agrees to this condition do they give him the daughter as a spouse.

591 These arrangements are very unstable. A man usually agrees to stay with his wife's parents, but after the marriage has been consummated, he will insist on moving away, being anxious to occupy his place as a dutiful son, living and working with his [606] father whose heir he may be. Women look forward to this kind of arrangement, the same way that they look forward to marrying a man whose mother is dead, because these are ways of avoiding the heavy burden of "becoming nueras" (daughter-in-law) or "suffering

firewood, a woman has few chances to go out of the compound. Going to gather wood is a very nice break in the routine, and women usually go in the company of other women with whom they chat, exchanging news and gossip. A young wife usually stays home cooking while her mother-in-law leaves the house to gather the fuel for the hearth. Even if a woman does go out to gather wood, she is expected to do so with her mother-in-law, rather than with the women of her own natal family. A woman talking about a bad daughter-in-law will say, "She does not even want to gather firewood with me, she always runs to her mother's."

Women look upon having their own homestead as the only solution for gaining independence. It is true that, even then, they are under their husband's authority, but they control the food brought by the husband to the home, and they can make their own decisions about the work schedule. They can also take time to visit their own female relatives and childhood girl friends, a habit which is disliked by their mothers-in-law as being a threat to their own position.

We can see, then, that there are several factors which provoke structural tensions in the compound home; some are economic, others are related to the ordering of social relations in the kinship domain, and still others depend on the aspirations of the individuals.

In the course of time, the structural tensions accumulate to the point that they precipitate the fission of the household. The triad of a woman, her son and her son's wife, and the dyadic conflict between a father and son dissolves the compound into two

592 nuclear households. The dynamics of social conflict, are, how-
578 ever, controlled by the traditional patterns of behavior and by the negative sanctions applied to the deviant. Only in exceptional situations does a couple leave the husband's parents' house before the birth of a child. Even then, the residential
• [626] change is expressed by the people in terms of on-going conflict between the women. People say that they moved "because the two women had a fight" and this or similar gossip follows every case of household fission.

593 The break between a father and son is only precipitated by open conflict. Part of this conflict is expressed in tensions between the men. Fathers insist that their sons should stay with them, sons insist that their fathers are selfish and unwilling to help them. But the bond between father and son is, in spite of the standard tensions, a crucial social relation for the society. A man is not judged with sympathy if he does not respect his father and keeps up a "good front" of harmonic relations with him vis-à-vis the community at large.

592 Then, it is not strange that the change of residence is
593 expressed through pointing out the tensions between the women
578 rather than the tensions between father and son. A woman and her
606 daughter-in-law are not members of the same consanguineal group residing in the household, the hoy ta yutil hna (of the same blood who live in the same house), and their antagonism is not viewed by the society as threatening to the unity of the kinship group, while the father-son relation is crucial in this domain. At the same time, the women are the expressive leaders of their

8: Hunt E-4,5 (1958)1962 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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CHAPTER VII

CORPORATE GROUPS WITHIN THE VILLAGE

Historical Perspective

174 611 591 601 583 423 428 It is probable that the communities of Amatenango and Aguacatenango had, at some time in their past, a patrilineal organization based on agnatic descent, patri-virilocality, a kinship terminology of the Normal Omaha type, and other associated features such as bride-price, groom service, patrilineal control of the rights to land usufruct, and patrilineal inheritance.

174 613 614 621 626 Each agnatic descent group formed segments of a corporate lineage, and several segments formed a sib. Lineages were localized, and they had important social functions. The heads of linear segments formed the local government and had the responsibility of controlling conflict and sanctioning individual behavior through the supernatural. They were believed to "own" powerful animal counterparts of their souls, which patrolled the village during sleep, and punished the misdemeanors of those men belonging to their line of descent. It is also probable that the lineage was [582] an exogamous unit, and there is some scanty evidence which points to the practice of cross-cousin marriage.

127 The evidence to support this hypothetical statement is of two types. On the one hand, there is some historical documentation in published, as well as manuscript, form. On the other hand,

613 476 [602] The patrilines function in several dimensions. Work groups, although invariably containing some bilateral and affinal relatives, recruit members mainly among agnatic kinsmen. Men fence their fields with the help of their brothers, father and sons; when villagers get together to buy a cow for a town fiesta celebration, each cow is bought by a group which contains agnatically related men. In one case, seventeen men who bought a cow together belonged to four patrilines which were neighbors among themselves. In another case, in which several men got together to build a house, nine were agnatic kinsmen, three were affinals (the son's wife's brother, the daughter's husband and the wife's brother), three were compadres and one a neighbor from across the street. The women who prepared the meal for the housewarming were: nine agnatically related to the household head; two agnatically related to the wife of the household head; three affinals of the household head; two affinals of the wife; and two neighbors. In another case, a man and his two sons, one of whom was living in a separate domestic group, helped in the construction, and several other men were contracted to help with the payment, although the daughter's husband, who was a carpenter, was called in to give advice and help.

613 476 626 627 Individuals, in time of trouble, seek advice from the elders of the patriline, which is the largest unit in which kinship solidarity functions as a controlling social force outside the domestic group. The patriline also exercises control in the form of moral pressure: gossip, accusations of witchcraft, and responsibility for vengeance when a patriline member has been

613 476 murdered. Informants declare that "all the Mendeztik will get 626 together against the Perezetik if a Perez kills a Mendez." We have 627 witnessed cases of "talk of revenge," but never any case of the 613 lineal solidarity functioning in this way in practice. In a case 736 where the father of a man dies, it is within the agnatic line that a man finds a sponsor to live with, to pay his bride-price, and to 613 work the land with. If there is conflict over an adulterous wife, 837 or over the distribution of an inheritance among brothers, it is the 428 duty of the elder members of the agnatic line to give advice, witness the distribution of the property, etc.

613 The patriline is not a land holding unit, in the sense that 423 there is no land that is said to belong to the line as a corporation, but the group of agnatically related men have control over the distribution of it, and its inheritance. If a man dies without adult sons, the closest agnatic kin (father, brother, or in some cases a father's brother if the other two are dead or have enough land) will take over the cultivated fields that he has left. According to the Mexican Agrarian Code, Ejido land can only be transmitted to people that live in the same domestic unit, and communal land cannot be transmitted at all: at the death of the person who held usufruct rights over a parcel, the land should revert to the Ayuntamiento, which has the power to re-distribute it as it considers convenient. In practice, in Aguacatenango, if the household fails to provide heirs, the parcels (both ejido and communal) are re-allocated among agnatic kin. Therefore, although the patriline does not "own" land, some land is allocated through linearity.

8: Hunt E-4,5 (1958)1962 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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593 626 A man whose brother is accused of witchcraft is very likely to share the same accusation; if a man beats his wife, he can be blamed by his younger brother because the first one's reputation hinders the chances of the second for getting himself a wife. If a woman is lazy, people will assume that her sister is also lazy, and so on. Paradoxically, at the same time that siblings are equivalent for certain purposes, they are not in relation to each other. An elder sibling has, from early in life, power to scold, punish or control his younger siblings. The older they grow, the more the age difference becomes important. While one could be already working with the father in the fields, the other is still a playing child. While one gets married and becomes a man, the other is still under his father's authority.

The elder brother is always a possible jural replacement 726 for the father. If the father dies and a man is a bachelor with a married brother, his elder brother replaces the father in terms of jural authority over him, is in charge of supporting him, working with him in the field, paying for his bride-price, etc.

476 578 On the one hand, the relationship of brothers is one of collaboration, intense association for work and mutual dependency; on the other, the differential distribution of authority creates a certain amount of antagonism between the two.

593 578 538 This antagonism between brothers is symbolically expressed in myths, legends and tales, many of which contain both a younger and elder brother who spend their time trying to kill each other, being alternately successful until the younger sibling is the final victor.

593 578 585 wedding. One son had married and already lived outside his father's compound. His younger brother was married, but stayed with the father. The younger brother obtained from his father a church wedding and the fiesta which accompanies it. The elder felt cheated. He was older, but he had not been given a church wedding, which he felt he should have had first. The father insisted that the elder son did not deserve it. First, he had not stayed in the house long enough after his marriage because "his wife was a bad daughter-in-law and insisted on moving out taking him away." Second, he was living outside his sitio and, being economically independent, he should have been able to pay for his own church wedding.

[626] The opinions of the villagers were divided. On the one hand, it was clear that only the child who is being supported had the right to get the father's direct economic assistance. On the other hand, the elder son had seniority rights.

593 578 428 We do not know the outcome of this particular case, but the evidence is strong enough to suggest that the relationship between brothers, especially in terms of each one's position as an heir with respect to their father, is not clearly resolved by the society, and is (1) a likely place of conflict in the social structure, and (2) a point of fission in the patriline genealogical continuity and depth. Second, the alternative pattern of patri-uxorilocal residence, and the concomitant fact that a man works the land with his affinals and inherits from them, and that a woman can inherit a house site, breaks in some cases the exclusive rights of inheritance within the patriline.

8: Hunt E-4,5 (1958)1962 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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562 The inheritance rights of women are highly controversial.
428 All the cases of conflict over the inheritance or rights of usu-
578 fruct of land, that we know about, involved a woman in the line
[183] of transmission. But however controversial, they are an estab-
lished pattern. This is shown in the following cases.

Case 1

159 Delfina is about twenty-four years old, and still single.
592 She was raised by her godmother in San Cristóbal, and her aspira-
593 tions are to become a Ladina. She has consistently refused to
562 marry any Indian man, and lives with her parents in a large com-
554 pound. She is economically self-sufficient (perhaps the only
428 woman in the village which is in the same position), because she
434 works for the INI as a sewing teacher, and her status in the household is quite high due to the fact that she draws a large salary and that her parents are close to senility and dependent on her. Until recently, her married brother lived in the compound with his parents. He insisted that at his parents death he should inherit everything: land, house and animals. Delfina and his father were of the opposite opinion: the house should be for Delfina, since she was supporting them and, as she expressed it: "she did not get married." Faced with the brother's insistence about his traditional rights, the father ordered him out of the household, and he and his wife left town and went to live in
• [626] Amatenango. Most villagers, however, think that Delfina is in the wrong. They say that she is alzada (prideful) and loose in her relations with Ladino men (the employees of the INI that come to the village), and "perhaps a witch." (See Genealogy, Fig. 15.)

8: Hunt E-4,5 (1958)1962 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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182 571 (602) based on non-kinship terms would maximize profit or material benefits, which the kinship frame limits considerably. Second, 182 183 461 556 the cultural norms imposed on the villager about the types of work which he is allowed to perform, about the maximum wealth which he is able to control, and about the distribution of this wealth, are, from a purely financial point of view, "anti-economical." 156 177 But an Indian living in a Ladino town, undoubtedly having the choice of improving his life from an economic point of view, 156 626 556 alienates himself from everything which is dear to him. An Indian attempting to live up to his aspirations of wealth within the community, alienates himself even more, and risks the dangers of witchcraft and social ostracism.

121 The phrase, "man does not live by bread alone," is very much of a truism here. If the primary factor in determining behavior were economical, the villager would have no need to live within the customary standards of living of his community nor would the corporate community persist. Each Indian could become a laborer of some sort, and integrate himself into the national society of Mexico.

But people make choices not only because they are financially advantageous, but because they preserve their standing within their kinship group, they provide satisfaction for their need of the psychological rewards of prestige and positive affection and for their need for "belonging" to a group of similar human beings with similar culture and aspirations.

We have to admit, then, that it is as impossible to analyze social dynamics, only taking into account economic variables, as

9:Nash E-5 (1964) 1970 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
Tzo?ontahal

Thus the social control is exerted through the traditional hierarchy, but the benefits of the labor go toward the priest's projects. The priest speaks with some satisfaction of the increasing control the "church" (he) has over the people. He maintains that this is because the people are more "civilized." For him, the indices to civilization are the facts that there is no drinking in the church, there is greater attendance at Mass, and more people are wearing Ladino clothing.

The second divergence in the elicited and observed accounts for the religious inauguration occurred when the civil officials, including the town secretary and síndico, assisted the religious officials in counting the money collected for the fiesta.

An important supplement to the behavorial data were the unsolicited comments of informants. Their anecdotes often gave me clues to their involvement in the gamesmanship of operating within culturally defined patterns. Although the informant focuses on the formal question, his growing boredom with the sequence (Who sat next to him? What did they do next? Who was there?) leads him to muse about the associated ideas and images which did interest him, often self-damaging or negative aspects of the culture which he might want to hide if questioned directly. The technique resembles that of the astronomer instructing the novice stargazer: "If you want to see the Pleiades, look at Jupiter, and out of the corner of your eye the nebulous cluster of stars of the Pleiades becomes visible."

The following illustrates how this free association emerged in the formal eliciting procedure:

Informant 2 constantly reiterated the danger his brother would encounter in undertaking the post of president as we discussed inauguration procedures. For example, when he gave me a list of participants at the Judge's house when his father took on that post, he mentioned the name of a widow, Cika, and provided the unsolicited information that her husband had been shot on December 16, 1963, the fiesta of Halal Me?tik Santalusia. Informant's statement: "He did not know he had an enemy, and so he walked alone that night. Each fiesta someone is killed. During the fiesta of San Francisco this year, another man in Bočibal was killed. No one knows why. He was knifed with a machete. I never go out alone at night because of the fights with the cooperative. They [the members of the opposing cooperative] are very hard *(ha? ben bolik)*. They claim they will kill us."

What prompted the next revelation was my com-

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